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ABSTRACT 
This paper reconsiders youth transition regime literature in the context of recent changes 
to Government policies in the age at which young adults are deemed independent of their 
parents, the privatization of the funding of higher education, and the current housing crisis. 
We provide new evidence regarding class inequalities in transitions to adulthood over the 
past twenty-five years. All social classes have seen a delay in some transitions such as 
getting a full time job, and becoming a home owner. Class differences in the likelihood of 
remaining in the parental home have widened. Regardless of social background, having a 
degree remains key to avoid precarious employment, but within the graduate and non-
graduate groups there are class inequalities in the likelihood of being unemployed, or in a 
routine job. Despite the recent postponement of motherhood among disadvantaged groups, 
the timing and partnership context of motherhood remains strongly class stratified. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RISKS IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD 
The transition to adulthood can be characterized as a change from being dependent 
upon others, to living as an autonomous and independent citizen. It is a particularly 
risky phase and the life course risks literature highlights how ‘negative’ experiences 
such as dropping out of education, experiencing unemployment, being stuck in low paid 
routine work, becoming homelessness, or experiencing early, unintended childbearing 
can have both short and long term implications for making the transition to economic 
independence. Disadvantaged young people often lack resources to navigate transitions 
or exercise choice in managing their lives (Furlong and Cartmel, 2006), and the amount 
of such resources depends partly on their social background. The social stratification 
literature thus highlights the role of parental resources in cushioning and protecting 
young adults from the increased uncertainty that young adults face. These two 
dimensions – life events and social stratification - complement each other and can be 
used to explore inequalities in transitions to adulthood (Kauppinnen et al, 2014). In this 
paper we use parental social class to explore changing inequalities in transitions to 
adulthood among UK young adults. We argue that the combination of recent historical 
events including the economic recession, Government austerity measures, changes in 
funding for higher education and the housing crisis in the UK, means that today’s young 
adults are now reliant upon parental financial assistance well into their twenties and 
thirties, and that youth social policies in the UK have become increasingly based on the 
assumption that young adults should call on their families for support. This has the 
potential to cause future increases in inequalities in transition to adulthood. 
 
1.2. THE UK CONTEXT 
The UK is an interesting case study because it has traditionally been seen as country 
where transitions to adulthood occur early: for example, historically the age at leaving 
home was one of earliest in Europe (Berrington and Stone, 2014) and normatively, 
compared to other European countries, the UK has the youngest age at which adulthood 
is perceived to begin, at 18.1 for males and 19.6 for females (Spéder et al., 2014). 
However the societal changes reviewed below are likely to have resulted in significant 
changes in behaviour, and in time are likely to impact normative beliefs about the 
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timings and types of trajectory to adulthood. In recent decades, trajectories towards 
adulthood have become more complex and protracted associated with increased 
uncertainty in young adults’ lives (Mills and Blossfeld, 2005). This uncertainty exists 
in multiple domains including difficulties in establishing stable employment, 
independent housing, stable relationships and co-residential partnerships. Some of 
these changes such as the increasingly precarious youth labour market, are common 
across developed countries, whilst others, notably the rapidly increasing private costs 
of higher education (OECD, 2015), and significant increases in housing costs 
(Berrington and Stone, 2014) have been much more rapid and significant in the UK.   
 
Labour Market Precarity: As in many developed countries increased 
globalisation and the changing labour market means that the benefits of extended 
education are increasingly important for achieving economic independence and it takes 
longer nowadays for young adults (even graduates) to establish a secure, financially 
stable career (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Settersten et al., 2015). Labour market entry 
in the UK has been characterised as fast but unstable (Walther, 2006). Young adults are 
disproportionately employed in precarious routine and semi-routine jobs which tend to 
have low wages and few prospects of career progression (Berrington et al., 2014). For 
some, and especially for graduates, these may be temporary jobs, before achieving a 
stable, well paid job. Others however remain in this type of insecure work well into 
their thirties (Berrington et al., 2014). These changes to the youth labour market 
predated the economic downturn from 2008 but it is clear that during the economic 
recession youth unemployment rates rose faster (especially for non-graduates aged 21-
30), and real incomes fell further than for older age groups (ONS, 2013, Belfield et al., 
2016).  According to Belfield et al., (2016, p. 12) “Despite something of a recovery in 
the last two years, median income for 22- to 30-year-olds is still 7% below its 2007–08 
level, driven by much weaker labour market outcomes for younger people since the 
recession.”   
 
Housing affordability: In the UK, decreases in young adults’ incomes have 
coincided with increased housing costs meaning that the affordability of housing has 
decreased considerably since 2008, with young adults being particularly hard hit 
(Wilcox et al., 2014). Housing costs have risen for a number of reasons. Since the 1970s 
the stock of state-subsidized, social rented housing has contracted such that the public 
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rented sector is now residualized and only available to those most vulnerable and in 
need, and in practice is not accessible to young single adults without dependants 
(Berrington and Stone, 2014). Secondly, as a result of increased house prices and the 
higher deposits being asked for by lenders, young adults are increasingly unable to buy 
their own homes (at least without financial assistance from others, usually parents and 
grandparents). Thus young adults are increasingly relying on the private rented sector 
for independent housing (Berrington and Simpson, 2016). Whilst a lack of comparable 
data makes it difficult to substantiate the extent to which rental prices have increased 
in recent decades, it is clear that rents in areas where young people are likely to find 
work have risen.  But additionally, what makes the UK stand apart from other European 
countries is the uncertainty associated with private renting. Short-hold tenancies are the 
norm which means that after an initial (usually six month) period, landlords are 
generally permitted to ask their tenants to leave. There is thus a lack of security and 
rights which means that private renting is not a desirable long term option (Hoolachan 
et al., 2016). Changes in housing allowances have also impacted upon the ability of low 
income young adults to sustain residential independence, in particular to live alone in a 
self-contained property (Berrington and Stone, 2014). The position of young adults in 
the UK is unique in two further ways: the rapid increased privatization of costs of higher 
education; and the strong social polarization in the timing and type of family formation.  
  
Student indebtedness: The UK stands out from other European countries in 
terms of the levels of debt that graduates bear. The UK underwent a rapid expansion of 
higher education especially during the 1990s: The age cohort participation rate more 
than doubled from 15% to 33% from 1987 to 1997 (Esson and Ertl, 2016). Subsequently 
the proportion of young adults in their late teens who attend university has continued 
to increase at a slightly slower pace: the HE participation rate in 2006 was 42% (38% 
for males and 47% for females), by 2013/14 the figure had risen to 47% (42% and 51% 
respectively). Thus we have seen the increased feminization of higher education 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2015). Since the late 1990s a series 
of changes have been introduced with the aim of reducing the cost to the UK 
Government of this burgeoning HE sector. In general the changes can be characterised 
as a reduction in the amount of maintenance grants available and their replacement with 
income contingent loans. Tuition fees of £1,000 per annum were introduced in England 
at the start of the 1998/99 academic year. The level of tuition fee that could be charged 
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increased in 2006/07 to £3,000. Tuition fee loans became available in the same year to 
enable students to defer payment of these fees until after their degree, once they had 
started earning (Kirby, 2016). Since 2012/13 universities have been able to charge up 
to £9,000 in tuition fees.  
 
As a result of an increasing number of students taking out loans, and a 
significant increase in the size of these loans, graduate indebtedness has increased 
(Bachan, 2014). Accurate data on the level of student debt is (perhaps surprisingly) not 
available, however Bachan suggests that student debt increased in real terms from 
around £2,047 in 1984 to £9,653 by 2004, whilst, for those graduating in 2011 this had 
increased up to £24,700. Following the increase in tuition fees to an average of around 
£9,000 per annum, current students must now take out even larger loans. Crawford and 
Jin (2014) estimate that students will leave university with nearly £20,000 more debt 
than in 2011, on average (£44,035 under the new system compared with £24,754 under 
the old system in 2014 prices). Students from poorer families will have the highest 
debts, but since graduates from poorer backgrounds are not expected to earn as much, 
they are expected not to have to repay as much of the loan (Britton et al., 2015). It is 
thus difficult to predict what the impact of this indebtedness will be for transitions to 
adulthood in the UK. Evidence from the United States (where loan repayments are not 
income contingent) suggests that student debt can postpone transitions in young 
adulthood (Bozick and Estacion, 2014; Gicheva, 2016). Whilst it is true that student 
debt in England is income contingent and that the threshold for repayment is relatively 
high compared to other countries (Kirby, 2016), the perception of being indebted could 
have an independent effect on behaviour. Furthermore, the impact of debt on the ability 
e.g. to leave home and buy a house will be related to the extent to which the young adult 
is able to receive financial support from their parents. Whilst in theory the student loan 
will not affect credit rating for house purchase, monthly repayments required for the 
student loan will affect mortgage lenders’ calculations as to how much an individual is 
able to repay each month and hence the amount they are willing to loan. Thus, 
inequality among graduates both in the amount of debt they graduate with, and the 
impact of that debt on their future life decisions could widen.  
 
Early childbearing and partnership instability: Although levels of teenage 
fertility have dropped significantly since 2010, the UK still has the highest rate of 
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teenage motherhood in Europe (ONS, 2016a). Furthermore, a significant proportion of 
these teen mothers are reported to be living as lone parents, more so than in other 
countries such as France (Ekert-Jaffé et al., 2002). UK young women who left 
education at age 16 with just compulsory education are particularly likely to either 
become mothers outside of a co-residential partnership, or to experience partnership 
dissolution at an early age (Beaujouan et al., 2016). The prevalence of early 
childbearing and non-resident fatherhood in the UK has important implications as to 
how transitions to adulthood are experienced very differently by gender. Whilst young 
mothers will often be making the transition to parenthood as a lone parent, young 
fathers will often not be co-resident with their children (Berrington and Stone, 2014).   
Furthermore, the impact of policy changes associated with austerity have affected 
young women and men differently as a result of their different caring responsibilities 
and patterns of co-residence with their children (Berrington and Stone, 2014; Stone et 
al., 2014).  
 
1.3. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO ‘BE AN ADULT’ AND ‘TO BE 
INDEPENDENT’? 
Independence in young adulthood is a multi-dimensional concept (Mary, 2014; 
Manzoni, 2016) and includes residential independence, economic independence and 
self-perceived independence, for example in terms of the level of responsibility and 
level of independence in decision making that the person feels they have. Much recent 
work has discussed changes in the social construction of what it means to be an adult, 
with young people increasingly questioning the relevance of the traditional ‘social 
markers’ of adulthood and emphasising more psychological and intra-individual 
characteristics. Empirical research suggests that leaving home and having a full-time 
job are still seen as important markers, but partnership and parenthood less so (Arnett 
2001; Spéder et al., 2014; Settersten et al., 2015; Sharon, 2015). However, even with 
these indicators there are problems of interpretation. 
 
Full-time employment by itself is not necessarily a good indicator of economic 
independence for two reasons. Firstly, many UK young adults are working full-time 
but on such low wages and with such poor career progression prospects (Berrington et 
al., 2014; Britton et al., 2015) that the fact that they are working full time does not 
  
 
6 
equate to being financially independent of their parents even for basic necessities, let 
alone allowing them to make the transition to residential independence. Economic self-
sufficiency has been defined by Sironi and Furstenburg (2012) as having an income 
greater than 200 percent of the poverty threshold for the type of family in which the 
young person is living. But being able to measure economic independence in this way 
necessitates income data at the level of the family unit, which is much harder to find 
than say information on the respondent’s economic activity. Secondly, in countries like 
the UK with high levels part-time working following childbearing, the proportion of 
women who are working full time tends to decrease with age rather than increase 
(Berrington et al., 2014). Furthermore, if one sees an increase over time in the 
proportion of young women working full-time and being economically independent 
this may have a different expected relationship with the likelihood of starting a family 
than would be the case for men’s economic independence depending upon whether the 
opportunity cost effect of motherhood outweighed the income effect (Sironi and 
Furstenberg, 2012). 
 
Cross-sectional indicators of residential independence from the parental home 
are also imprecise as measures of young adults “independence” for two reasons: Firstly, 
a significant proportion of young adults return to the parental home following an initial 
departure, often in response to life events such as finishing higher education, losing a 
job or partnership dissolution (Stone et al., 2014). Secondly, we argue that what is 
important for young adults’ wellbeing is attaining a stable and sustainable housing 
situation and in the UK context this generally means achieving the security of tenure 
that comes either with Government subsidized social housing, or through owner 
occupation. Thus in the UK context, the transition to either social rented (increasingly 
residualized and only available to those most vulnerable), or owner occupied housing 
is more important than living away from the parental home per se as a key marker in 
the transition to adulthood (Hoolachan et al., 2016). Therefore in this paper we view 
being an owner occupier as a key social indicator of successful transition to adulthood. 
 
1.4. AIMS OF THE PAPER 
This paper has two aims – one theoretical and one empirical. We reconsider the youth 
transition regime literature in terms of recent changes to UK Government policies in 
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the age at which young adults are deemed independent of their parents, the privatization 
of the funding of higher education, and the current ‘housing crisis’ Second, we provide 
new empirical evidence as to how class inequalities in transitions to adulthood have 
been changing over the past twenty-five years. The indicators of independence which 
we explore are: leaving home; becoming a home owner; having an economically secure 
job; partnership formation; and entry into parenthood. 
 
2. YOUTH TRANSITION REGIMES  
2.1. YOUTH SOCIAL POLICY REGIME TYPOLOGIES 
Based on Esping Andersen’s (1990) regime classification, Walther (2006) argued that 
Government youth social policies could be categorized into one of four types: 
Universalistic e.g. Sweden, Finland; Employment centred e.g. Germany, France; 
Liberal e.g. UK; and Sub-protective e.g. Italy, Spain. Walther demonstrated that a much 
higher proportion of young adults’ income derives from benefits and employment in 
the UK, than in Italy or Germany (where parents were the most important source), or 
in Denmark (where both employment and training allowances were more significant). 
Chevalier (2015) extended this work, developing a two-dimensional typology of youth 
welfare citizenship which differentiates between the treatment of youth in social 
policies, and their treatment in school to work transitions.  For Chevalier, independence 
of young people is defined in terms of their access to financial independence. Table 1 
shows the characteristics associated with the first dimension – youth social citizenship. 
In some countries youth are defined primarily as children in terms of their social 
citizenship status in the welfare state. As children they can only access benefits 
indirectly as dependants (in contrast to adults “who are seen as independent, and can 
claim for benefits on their own” (Chevalier, 2015, p. 2). Thus Chevalier follows earlier 
British scholars including Harris (1989) and Jones and Wallace (1992) who highlight 
the age criteria used to decide whether young people have access to benefits and at what 
level. Chevalier applies the concept of ‘defamilialization’ which is usually used to 
examine the extent to which women can provide for themselves, regardless of their 
family status, to young people. “The more familialized social benefits are the less young 
people are able to claim for social benefits on their own, and the lower their coverage 
by social benefits” (Chevalier, 2015, p. 10). Chevalier also extends the previous 
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literature by examining all of the sources of income support available to young people 
including students.  
 
  
Familialized citizenship 
 
 
Individualized citizenship 
 
Image of youth Children Adults 
Maintenance claims for children 
after their civil majority 
Yes No 
Age limitations to access social 
benefits 
Late: after 20, around 25  Early: before 30, around 18  
Status in social security Dependent Independent 
Aid for students – family policy Yes No 
Aid for students – student support Grants depending on 
parental income 
Grants and/or loans non-
dependent on parental 
income 
Social security coverage Low High 
Welfare regime Bismarckian Beveridgean 
Table 1: The two figures of youth social citizenship as described by Chevalier (2015). 
Source: Chevalier, 2015, Table 1. 
 
Referring to Table 1, Chevalier (2015) argues that UK youth have 
individualized social citizenship because: they have access to welfare benefits like Job 
Seekers Allowance from a young age (18); that youth who have passed the age of 
majority are not supported indirectly through family allowances or tax relief provided 
to parents (as is the case in Germany and France); UK parents are not obliged under 
law to support their adult children who are unemployed or who remain in education (as 
is the case for example in Germany where parents are obliged to support their child 
until they have finished their studies); and that student support for higher education is 
well developed with either grants or loans available to all, irrespective of parental 
income. We reconsider some of these assumptions regarding student support in the next 
section. 
 
Chevalier (2015, pp. 6 – 7) combines this dimension of “youth social citizenship’ 
with a second dimension - “youth economic citizenship” – which identifies the extent 
to which “financial independence is achieved through supported access to 
employment”. He arrives at four groups of European countries. The first cluster – 
“denied youth citizenship” includes southern European countries and France, and is 
characterized by “familialized social citizenship” and “selective economic citizenship”. 
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The Scandinavian countries are clustered together under the label “enabling youth 
citizenship” which provides individualized social citizenship and encompassing 
economic citizenship. The third cluster “Monitored youth citizenship” includes 
Germany, Austria and Luxembourg and reflects familialized social citizenship and 
encompassing economic citizenship. The UK and Ireland are the final, fourth cluster, 
labelled “Second class youth citizenship” reflecting individualized social citizenship 
and selective economic citizenship. Like Walther (2006) Chevalier notes the early entry 
of low skilled young people into the labour force whose wages are kept low. 
 
3. A RECONSIDERATION OF YOUTH SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE UK 
 
It is important to reconsider whether UK youth social citizenship is individualised or 
whether it has shifted dramatically towards a more familialized model, especially since 
the credit crisis and economic downturn from 2008. Below we explore three main 
reasons why youth policy has become more familialized: austerity and welfare 
retrenchment; the privatization of higher education costs; and the housing crisis.  
 
3.1. AUSTERITY AND WELFARE RETRENCHMENT 
Chevalier argued that in the UK young people became adult at early age – between 18 
and 20 (Table 1). However, the age criteria used for assessing whether youth are 
independent of their parents differs considerably across UK policy domains (Table 2). 
Some markers of adulthood, such as being able to marry (with parental consent) are as 
low as 16 years, other markers, such as the age at which students are deemed 
independent of their parents for the calculation of means-tested student loan availability 
is 25 years. Furthermore, the level of income available through welfare benefits and 
through minimum wage legislation differs considerably according to current age, such 
that although young single adults have access to Job Seekers Allowance at age 18, the 
low payment level (£57.90 a week for single 18-24 year old in 2016) does not afford 
financial independence. Whilst the “adult rate” of Job Seekers Allowance / Income 
Support is paid to those aged 25 and over, in terms of minimum wage thresholds, 
adulthood is deemed to begin at age 21.  
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Additionally, recent policy changes undertaken by the UK Government means 
that the age at which parents are assumed to be responsible for their children has shifted 
upwards. We can see this in educational policies, minimum wage legislation and in 
housing benefit policies. Firstly, the age at which young people (in England and Wales) 
are expected to remain in education or training increased from 16 to 17 in 2013 and to 
18 in 2015. It is assumed that the young person’s family will provide support during 
this extended period in education (Wakeling et al., 2015). The discourse behind the 
raising of the participation age argues that education is crucial to economic growth and 
social justice, but it is also a convenient a way of reducing the high number of NEETS 
in the UK, though there have been doubts about its enforcement (Maguire, 2013; 
Woodin et al., 2013).  
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Age 
 
Type of social support 
 
16 yrs Minimum age can get married (with parental consent) 
16 yrs National minimum wage rate for 16-17 year olds 
16 yrs Minimum age lone parents can claim income support 
18 yrs (Rise from compulsory school leaving age of 16 in 2015) Compulsory age at which young 
person should remain in full or part time education or apprenticeship 
18 yrs Age at majority / Minimum age for voting in a General Election 
18 yrs Minimum age can get married (without parental consent) 
18 yrs National minimum wage rate for 18-20 year olds 
18 yrs Jobs seekers allowance – available to all unemployed young people whether or not have 
children 
21 yrs National minimum wage rate for 21-24 year olds (adult rate) 
22 yrs (Rise from 18) Housing benefit available to low income young people (but constrained to 
amount to rent a room in shared house for those with no co-resident children) 
25 yrs Minimum age that single adults can receive higher rate of Income Support and Job Seekers 
Allowance. 
25 yrs National minimum wage rate for 25+ year olds (national living wage). Introduced in April 
2016. Previously the top band was attained at age 21. 
25 yrs Age at which undergraduate is deemed independent for assessing means tested grants / 
loans 
35 yrs (Rise from 25) Housing benefit available at higher rate available to all young people 
irrespective of whether have co-resident children 
Table 2: Selected age markers in UK Government policies and legislation, 2016. 
 
Sources: https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates,  
https://www.gov.uk/jobseekers-allowance/overview,  
https://www.gov.uk/housing-benefit/overview,  
https://www.gov.uk/apply-for-student-finance/household-income  
 
Secondly, in April 2016, we saw further age differentiation in the 
implementation of the UK Government's National Living Wage. This new “living 
wage” (currently set at £7.20 per hour) was only made available to those aged 25 and 
over. The current National Minimum Wage for those under the age of 25 still applies 
which assumes therefore that employed young people aged under 25 are also often 
being financially supported through private (family) sources. 
 
The assumption that parents should be providing support to their adult children 
if they are unemployed or on a low wage has become much more visible in recent years 
due to changes in the rules for accessing housing benefits (Berrington and Stone, 2014). 
For a number of years, Conservative politicians have been quite open about their desire 
to cut all benefits for young adults aged under 25 as a way of reducing welfare 
dependency and the number of NEETS. In the 2013 Conservative Party Conference for 
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example, the then Prime Minister David Cameron argued “Today it is still possible to 
leave school, sign on, find a flat, start claiming housing benefit and opt for a life on 
benefits. It's time for bold action here." (The Independent, 2013).  
 
A key change affecting young single adults was the restriction, in April 2012, of 
housing benefit for those aged under 35, to the amount of money required to rent a room 
in a shared house (Berrington and Stone, 2014). The Shared Accommodation Rate 
(SAR) was originally introduced as the Single Room Rate, capping housing benefit for 
those aged under 25 but was extended to those aged under 35 in April 2012. The 
Government’s stated objectives for this extension to age 35 are: to ensure that those 
receiving housing benefit do not have an advantage over those who are not on benefit, 
but have to make similar choices about what they can afford; to help contain growing 
housing benefit expenditure; and to remove a potential work disincentive (Berrington 
and Stone, 2014). There is thus a belief that those who are out of work should not be 
able to afford e.g. a self-contained flat, when those in low paid work would not be able 
to. Most recently, the newly elected Conservative government has gone further and 
announced the removal of all housing benefit entitlement for most childless 18-21 year 
olds who are out of work (The Independent, 2015). The assumption is that young people 
on low income should remain living in the parental home at least until they are aged 22, 
and that they should be expected to house share (possibly with friends, but also with 
strangers) until their mid-thirties.  
3.2. THE PRIVATIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION COSTS 
Chevalier (2015, p. 15) characterises the UK has having individualised youth social 
citizenship as a result of a well-developed support for higher education where he argues 
that “ the delivery and the level of the aid do not depend on parental income, and as a 
result, every (undergraduate) student can claim for it.” Chevalier argues that 100% of 
UK undergraduates are in receipt of student support in 2011-2012. This, rather positive 
picture is somewhat misleading since he does not distinguish between student grants 
and loans. Furthermore, the characterisation also does not take into account tuition fee 
levels and hence the extent of indebtedness in which UK graduates find themselves.  
 
Figure 1 shows for a number of OECD countries the percentage of bachelor 
(undergraduate) students who are in receipt of either student grants /public loans/ or 
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scholarships. The UK along with the US and New Zealand Australia does have good 
coverage of student support. However, most of the support provided to students is in 
the form of loans rather than grants or scholarships. In most years over the past decade, 
student grants have been available to a minority of student on a means-tested basis 
(Bolton, 2016). However, from 2016/17 no Government grants at all are available to 
students – all the support available will be through income contingent tuition fee loans 
and maintenance loans. However, the amount of maintenance loan available to students 
is means tested and students aged under 25 are assessed on the basis of their parent’s 
income – i.e. they are not seen as independent (Wakeling et al., 2015). Thus family 
income does matter and the system should not be seen as individualized. It might also 
be argued that even the highest level of student maintenance loan available is unlikely 
to support a young person through university and hence parental financial assistance is 
often called upon. 
Figure 1: Student support and tuition fees (US dollars) for full time bachelor students (public 
institutions) in selected OECD countries, academic year 2013-14. 
Source: OECD (2015) 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
0 20 40 60 80 100
A
ve
ra
ge
 t
u
it
io
n
 f
ee
s 
(U
SD
)
Percentage in receipt of public  loans / scholarships / grants
UK (England)
USA
Australia
New 
Zealand
NorwayTurkeyFinland
France
Italy
Switzerland
Austria
Belgium (Fr)
Belgium (Fl)
  
 
14 
 
Finally, Chevalier (2015) did not consider the significantly higher level of tuition 
fees that are now paid by UK students (OECD, 2015). The introduction of tuition fees 
has already resulted in a rise in student debt and student indebtedness will rise further 
in the future since the UK Government announced in the summer Budget 2015 that 
maintenance grants would be replaced in full by loans for new students in England from 
2016/17. The maximum loan support (for those living away from home outside 
London) has increased to £8,200 per year. The 2015/16 maximum (grant plus loan) was 
just over £7,400 per annum (Bolton, 2016). This means that students will increasingly 
have cash available to them whilst they are students, but their indebtedness on 
graduation will increase. As a result we would argue that the family (and particularly 
parents) will be increasingly required to financially support their adult children through 
their twenties and thirties, and there will be inequalities, especially among those groups 
earning just over the threshold required to pay, as to whether parents can help to repay 
loans faster and thus give young adults a boost towards achieving economic 
independence and independence in other realms – particularly in being able to buy their 
own home. 
3.3. INTER-GENERATIONAL HELP WITH HOUSING COSTS  
Over and above the impact that cuts to housing benefits have had on the ability of low-
income youth to attain residential independence, increased house prices coupled with 
the credit crunch has meant that the role of the wider family in helping young adults 
own their own home has become far more salient (Heath and Calvert, 2013; Hoolachan 
et al., 2016).  Owner occupation has traditionally been the dominant and desired housing 
type (Pannell, 2012) with social renting whilst being secure, stigmatized as being only 
for the poorest and most vulnerable. However, as Wilcox notes house prices generally 
increased but more importantly the size of mortgage deposits required have 
significantly increased. Hence the need for parental assistance from the ‘Bank of Mum 
and Dad’. Heath and Calvert (2013) document, for their middle class sample of young 
adults, substantial monetary exchanges to offset costs to cover rent or mortgage 
deposits, or the purchase of properties by parents or grandparents as investment 
properties which were then rented out to young adult family members at reduced rent. 
The percentage of first-time home purchases completed with assistance in the form of 
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a loan or gift from friends or family increased markedly following the recession – from 
26% in the period 2005-08, to 38% in the period 2009-13 (Humphrey and Scott, 2013).  
 
In summary, UK Government policies have resulted in a residualised social 
housing sector and insecure private rented sector (Kemp and Kofner, 2010). 
Government policies continue to focus on helping young adults into home ownership 
(e.g. through help to buy scheme) and young adults themselves continue to look to 
owning their own home as a way of “settling down” and achieving stability (Hoolachan 
et al., 2016). The ability of young adults to achieve this independence is however highly 
dependent on parental resources and can thus be seen as familialized.  
 
 
4. CHANGING CLASS INEQUALITIES IN TRANSITIONS TO 
ADULTHOOD: NEW EVIDENCE 
 
In this section we first present the overall change in the proportion of UK young adults 
who have achieved various social markers of transition to adulthood – living 
independently of the parental home, being an owner occupier, being in full time 
employment, having a co-residential partner and being a parent. We then present 
evidence as to whether parental class differences in some of the markers of 
independence have changed in the UK in the past 25 years. We utilize data from three, 
nationally representative surveys which are chosen because a) they have a large enough 
sample size to look at specific five year age groups, b) they identify when the young 
person arrived in the UK and hence we can identify those who were born or who spent 
their childhood in the UK, and c) the survey collected information on the occupation of 
the respondent’s mother and father when they were aged 14. Although not equally 
spaced over historical time, these surveys provide unique evidence, covering the past 
25 years or so, capturing the situation in 1991 using data from wave 1 of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 2009/10 using data from the first wave of the United 
Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS), and 2014/15 employing data 
from two consecutive cross-sectional waves of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). In 
all analyses survey weights are applied and we only include youth aged 16-34 who were 
either born in the UK, or who arrived in the UK before age 15. Occupational class is 
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coded using the 3-category National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-
SEC)1 2. Conceptually, the NS-SEC measures employment relations and conditions of 
occupations, and hence reflects the structure of socio-economic positions in society 
(Rose and Pevalin, 2005). We contrast the situation of young adults whose parents were 
in professional and managerial occupations; those whose parents were in intermediate 
jobs such as a fire fighter or a photographer; and those young adults from routine and 
manual class backgrounds whose parents were employed in jobs such bus driver, refuse 
collector, shop assistant. For the BHPS and UKHLS surveys we code parental class as 
the highest occupational class of either the mother or father. Parental occupation started 
to be collected within the July to September quarter of the Labour Force Survey in 
2014. The LFS asks for the occupation of the main earner. Respondents are included in 
the analysis sample only if it is the first time their household is interviewed so as not to 
duplicate the data for any respondents who happened to be included in both the July-
September quarter of 2014 and 2015.   
 
4.1. CHANGES IN THE PROPORTION WHO HAVE ACHIEVED SOCIAL 
MARKERS OF ADULTHOOD 
Table 3 shows for each five-year age group: 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34, the changes across 
time in the proportion of those who have achieved key transitions. This includes the 
percentage of UK men and women who have (at least) an undergraduate degree, are 
currently living independently of their parents, own their own homes, are in full time 
employment, have a co-residential partner, and have a biological child. The situation in 
2014/15 is contrasted to that in 2009/10 and 1991. Women continue to make their 
transitions to adulthood earlier than men, but the past 25 years has seen the 
postponement in achievement of most social markers of adulthood to later ages for both. 
This postponement is associated with the delay in the age at which young people leave 
full time education, particularly for women among whom the proportion with a degree 
has almost doubled from around one quarter in 1991 to just under half in 2014/15. 
                                                 
1 In analyses of BHPS 1991 and UKHLS 2009/10 NS-SEC90 is used. NS-SEC10 is the only schema 
available from the 2014/15 LFS. Since we are using a very broad three-category schema this change will 
not affect our findings.  
2 We exclude those young adults for whom parental class is not known. This group includes: respondents 
who did not answer the question sufficiently completely for parental class to be assigned; those whose 
parent(s) were not in the labour force, for example because they were unemployed or economically 
inactive. 
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Partly as a result of the delay in leaving full time education and partly due to the 
rise in labour market flexibility and short hours working (see Berrington et al., 2014 for 
discussion of increased part time working among young people) the percentage who 
are in full time work by their early twenties has fallen considerably, particularly for 
men: In 1991 71% of men aged 20-24 were estimated to be full-time employed, 
compared to around 54% in 2014/15.  Even among those in their late twenties the 
proportion of men in full time work has dropped slightly over the 25-year period. For 
young women, a different pattern is seen – reflecting offsetting drivers: The extension 
to the average age at leaving full time education means that fewer women in their early 
twenties are in full time work nowadays. However the delay in the average age of entry 
into motherhood, together with more full time working among young mothers, means 
higher rates of employment for women in their early thirties. 
 
For both men and women there has been a decline in the proportion currently 
living independently of their parents. Increasing participation in higher education 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s actually increased the numbers of young adults 
leaving home at ages 18-19 (Berrington et al., 2009; Berrington and Stone, 2014). 
However, many of those who left for non-family formation reasons returned home 
(Stone et al., 2014), and we can see from Table 3 that there has been an increase in the 
proportion of young men and women living in the parental home throughout the 20-29 
age range, with a smaller increase for those in their thirties. For example, in 1991, 81% 
of men in their late 20s were living independently of their parents, by 2014/15 this was 
just 67%. The decrease in residential independence for women in their late twenties 
was similar - from 90% to 80%. In 2014/15 around 14% of men are living with their 
parent(s), compared with just 8% of women of the same age. This delay in leaving the 
parental home is associated with the delay in forming a first co-residential partnership 
at all ages 20-34, but particularly in their early twenties. The average age at motherhood 
has been increasing for many years in the UK, but teenage childbearing remained 
relatively high up until around 2010. Just over one quarter of women in their early 20s 
in 1991 and 2009/10 was a parent. But by 2014/15 this had reduced by to just one fifth. 
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1991 2009/10 2014/15 
Has an undergraduate degree 
Men 20-24 21.8 26.9 29.8 
25-29 28.5 37.7 41.8 
30-34 34.8 42.7 40.4 
  
Women 20-24 24.6 31.5 32.6 
25-29 27.8 43.4 48.2 
30-34 25.7 48.3 51.9 
Living independently of parents 
Men  20-24 47.2 38.8 31.2 
25-29 80.7 71.4 66.5 
30-34 89.1 88.6 86.1 
  
Women 20-24 62.8 55.8 42.2 
25-29 90.2 84.1 79.9 
30-34 96.3 93.3 92.0 
Is living independently as a home-owner3 
Men 20-24 20.1 7.4 5.5 
25-29 56.3 36.0 25.7 
30-34 68.0 56.7 50.5 
  
Women 20-24 29.6 11.9 7.4 
25-29 58.6 38.0 31.1 
30-34 73.0 58.8 52.1 
In full-time employment 
Men 20-24 70.9 52.9 53.5 
25-29 83.7 78.6 78.5 
30-34 86.2 84.5 85.2 
  
Women 20-24 59.5 41.9 42.4 
25-29 50.7 49.8 53.7 
30-34 41.1 44.2 46.2 
Has a co-residential partner 
Men 20-24 27.5 19.1 16.2 
25-29 62.1 54.8 49.5 
30-34 75.4 72.6 70.2 
  
Women 20-24 42.4 30.1 23.7 
25-29 71.2 59.2 54.5 
30-34 79.7 69.7 69.8 
Has a biological child2 
Women 20-24 27.0 26.3 20.1 
25-29 55.6 47.5 42.9 
30-34 73.4 67.0 64.4 
Sample size in (n=100%) 
Men 20-24 392 1379 3192 
25-29 421 1308 3118 
30-34 471 1356 3339 
  
Women 20-24 419 1674 3313 
25-29 522 1789 3548 
30-34 486 1722 3830 
Table 3: The percentage of UK-born1 young men and women who have achieved key transitions by 
current age group, as reported in 1991, 2009/10 and 2014/15. 
Sources: 1991 from wave 1 of BHPS, 2009/10 from wave 1 of Understanding Society, 2014/15 data 
from UK Labour Force Surveys.  
 
Notes: 1refers to individuals who were either born in UK, or who arrived aged under 15. 2Parenthood 
data are only presented for women since complete information on men’s past fertility is not available 
from BHPS or LFS. 3Those living independently of the parental home who are living in owner-occupied 
housing. Weighted percentages, unweighted sample n.  
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Owner occupation remains an aspiration for many UK young adults, and in 1991 
over one quarter of men and women aged 20-24 were already living away from their 
parents in owner-occupied housing, rising to a half of men and women in their late 
twenties. By 2009/10 these proportions had fallen dramatically for all age groups, but 
especially among those in their early twenties. By 2014/15 approximately 6-7% of men 
and women in their early twenties own their own home, rising to 26% and 31% of men 
and women in their late twenties. For those in their early thirties, rates of owner 
occupation have also fallen – from being the majority in 1991 (68% of men and 73% 
of women) to around one half in 2014/15.  
 
4.2. CLASS DIFFERENCES IN RESIDENTIAL INDEPENDENCE 
As discussed in Berrington and Stone (2014) and Berrington and Simpson (2016) there 
has been a significant increase in the proportion of young adults living with their parents 
over the past two decades (particularly for men and women in their twenties). The 
increase predated the 2008 recession but continued after this point, accelerating for 
those in their early twenties. Traditionally, young adults from socio-economically 
advantaged backgrounds tended to make the transition out of the parental home at an 
early age, often to attend higher education. Today, however the social class gradient in 
the likelihood of living in the parental home is much flatter. This is because the increase 
in co-residence has occcured for youth from all class backgrounds (Figure 2), but has 
been particularly strong (at least among those in their twenties) for those from the 
wealthiest backgrounds.  
 
Drawing on the detailed discussion from Berrington and Stone (2014) and Stone 
et al., (2014) who examined the dynamics of leaving and returning home in the UK, 
explanations for the increase in co-residence differ according to class background. For 
advantaged youth, an increasing number in their early twenties are remaining in the 
parental home when they attend university, or are returning home at the end of their 
studies. Lewis and colleagues (2016) found that middle class parents were providing 
material and emotional support to their offspring (recent graduates) thereby providing 
them the freedom not to have to take any job but to wait to find a “proper graduate 
career job”. This is consistent with the idea that young adults from more advantaged 
socio-economic backgrounds will have greater possibilities to explore and experiment 
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during “emergent adulthood” (Arnett, 2004) than those from poorer socio-economic 
backgrounds. Simultaneously, disadvantaged youth are delaying their departure from 
the parental home, or are returning having experienced more negative life course 
“turning points” such as job loss and partnership dissolution (Stone et al., 2014).  By 
their early thirties the majority of young adults have left the parental home. However, 
there is a striking contrast between men from professional backgrounds, and men from 
routine/manual backgrounds.  Almost one in five men from routine and manual class 
backgrounds remains living in the parental home in their early thirties, as compared 
with just one in ten men from professional backgrounds. Whilst the proportion of 
disadvantaged men living in the parental home has increased, it has remained more 
constant for disadvantaged women. This may reflect a tendency for early entry into 
motherhood among women from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, and the 
differential way in which UK social policies support the residential independence of 
low income young mothers (who are prioritized in the provision of social housing), and 
non-resident fathers (who are not classified as having dependants and hence do not have 
access to child related means-tested benefits, or to social housing where having 
dependants enhances the chances of securing accommodation) (Berrington and Stone, 
2014; Stone et al., 2014).  
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a) 20-24 
b) 25-29 
c) 30-34 
 
Figure 2: Percentage living independently of parental home by parental social class. UK born1 men and 
women aged a) 20-24, b) 25-29 and c) 30-34. 1991, 2009/10, and 2014/15 
 
Sources: 1991 from wave 1 of BHPS, 2009/10 from wave 1 of UKHLS, 2014/15 from Labour Force 
Surveys. 1refers to individuals who were either born in UK, or who arrived aged under 15.  
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4.3. CLASS DIFFERENCES IN HOME OWNERSHIP 
UK young adults continue to view owning a home of their own as a key marker of the 
transition to adulthood (Hoolachan et al., 2016) and the aspiration for home ownership 
continues despite declines in the actual numbers becoming home owners (Pannell, 
2002; DCLG, 2016).  In Figure 3 therefore we focus on the proportion of men and 
women who are living away from the parental home in an owner occupied dwelling3. 
We present the data for the three age groups 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34. We see a very 
large move away from owner occupation, particularly for men, and for those from 
professional and managerial backgrounds at the younger ages where in 1991 almost 
30% owned their own home as compared with just 5% in 2014/15. Much of the change 
at the youngest age groups will reflect the increasing mobility of young professionals 
today, and the postponement of family formation, rather than the unaffordabilty of 
housing per se. Given the difference in numbers of years covered it is difficult to 
compare the size of the decline pre- and post recession, but the decline in owner 
occupation predated the economic downturn in 2008 and for most groups, apart from 
professionals in their early thirties, has continued from 2008 to 2014/15. Thus among 
those in their twenties, the class gradient in owner occupation has actually flattened - It 
could be that for more advantaged young men in their twenties, family formation 
especially parenthood has not yet begun, and renting may be a positive thing, for 
example providing geographical mobility, which is a characteristic feature of graduates, 
especially of those from higher social classes. Furthermore, house sharing in the private 
rented sector may be seen as more normative and acceptable among graduates who will 
often have experience of sharing student houses. However, among those in their thirties, 
class gradients have increased over the quarter century between 1991 and 2014/15. In 
the most recent observed data, almost two thirds of men and women in their thirties 
from professional social class backgrounds were owner occupiers as compared to less 
than one half of those from routine and manual class backgrounds. 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that the young person is necessarily the person who owns the home, but most house 
shares take place within the private rented sector. 
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a) 20-24 
b) 25-29 
c) 30-34 
Figure 3: Percentage living independently as owner occupiers by parental social class. UK born1 men 
and women aged a) 20-24, b) 25-29, and c) 30-34. 1991, 2009/10, and 2014/15 
Sources: 1991 from wave 1 of BHPS, 2009/10 from wave 1 of UKHLS, 2014/15 from Labour Force 
Surveys. 1refers to individuals who were either born in UK, or who arrived aged under 15.   
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4.4. CLASS DIFFERENCES IN PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT 
Economic independence from parents is hard to define, and even harder to measure 
using survey data (See Berrington et al., 2014 for a detailed discussion of the difficulties 
in measuring economic precarity among young adults using survey data). Ideally, 
detailed information on income gained from different sources (including inter-
generational transfers) would be available at both the individual and family level. We 
would then be able to make some statements as to the extent to which young adults 
were above or below official poverty lines according to their family status (Sironi and 
Furstenberg, 2012). Unfortunately, such data are not available for the UK for all three 
time periods4.  Instead we define precarity as being either non-employed (i.e. 
unemployed or economically inactive), or employed in a routine or manual (NS-SEC 
3) job. Many routine and manual jobs are low paid and insecure and are unlikely to 
provide full economic independence. Estimates from the 2015 Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings indicate that the median salary for young adults aged 22-29 in elementary 
jobs ranges from around £11,000 to £15,000 (ONS, 2015).  Berrington and colleagues 
(2014) showed that the proportion of men and women aged 25-34 in the lowest quartile 
of (gross) personal income was around 44% for those working in semi-routine and 
routine occupations as compared to just 10% of those working in professional and 
managerial occupations.  
 
Recent evidence has demonstrated the continuation of inter-generational 
transmission of occupational class (Burkodi et al., 2015; Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004). 
An obvious question is the extent to which these relationships are mediated via the 
young person’s educational qualification. Hence in Figure 4 we examine, for non-
graduates and graduates separately, parental class differences in the likelihood of being 
in precarious economic position (as defined as being either unemployed or 
economically inactive, or being in a routine or manual job). This analysis is not possible 
for 1991 since the sample size of the BHPS is too small to subset according to graduate 
status, and so we show the estimates from UKHLS from 2009/10 and those from the 
                                                 
4  The UK Labour Force Survey does collect data on earnings (for employees only), but does not collect 
information about income coming from other sources. Surveys which do have detailed information on 
income sources e.g. the family resources survey do not have the required information on parental 
occupation and are insufficient in sample size to look at specific five year age groups. 
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2014/15 LFS. In order to increase the available sample, we combine the 25-29 and 30-
34 age groups. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of non-graduate and graduate UK-born men aged 25-34 who are either not 
employed or in a routine job, by parental class.  
Sources: 2009/10 from wave 1 of UKHLS, 2014/15 from Labour Force Surveys. 1refers to individuals 
who were either born in UK, or who arrived aged under 15.  
Note: Analysis excludes full-time students. 
 
The patterns seen for 2009/10 and 2014/15 are similar, reflecting the fact that 
economic recovery has not been so evident for young adults in the UK as compared 
older workers (Belfield et al., 2016). Compared with male graduates,  non-graduates in 
their late twenties and early thirties are over three times more likely to be either not 
employed at all, or to be employed in a routine or manual occupation. This pattern holds 
regardless of social backgrounds suggesting that higher education remains a key 
pathway to avoid precarious employment. Among non-graduates, there is a significant 
class gradient as to the proportion who remain in a precarious economic position – 44% 
of those from professional  backgrounds are not employed or who have a routine job, 
compared to 60% of those from a routine and manual background. Among graduates 
the class gradient is much flatter. In fact, at the height of the economic downturn in 
2009/10 graduates from professional backgrounds were slightly more likely to be out 
of the labour market as compared to graduates from other class backgrounds which we 
might speculate may relate to the greater ability of graduates from richer backgrounds 
to wait until they find a “proper job” rather than having to take anything that comes 
along (Lewis et al., 2016). Although unemployment rates declined in 2014/15 Figure 4 
suggests that the proportion of men,  particularly those from intermediate and routine 
class backgrounds who are engaged in a routine or manual job has actually increased 
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since the recession.  We might question however, the extent to which these new routine 
and manual jobs are sufficiently well paid, and offer sufficient career progression to 
allow young people to become economically independent from their parents.  
 
4.5. CLASS DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY FORMATION 
Over the past 25 years there has been a delay in the average age at entry into parenthood, 
and significant change to the partnership context within which children are being born, 
with cohabitation and lone motherhood becoming equally common as marriage as 
settings for childrearing. Figure 5 compares the proportion of UK women aged 20-24 
and 25-29 from each class background who are living with a biological child, 
disaggregated according to their current partnership status, for 1991, 2009/10 and 
2014/15.  
 
In 1991 there were already strong class differences in the likelihood of being a 
mother before age 25 and before 30 according to parental class, consistent with other 
research (Kiernan, 1997; Berrington and Pattaro, 2014). During the period 1991 to 
2009/10 entry into motherhood was delayed further, such that the proportion of women 
from professional, intermediate and routine class backgrounds who were mothers in 
their late twenties had declined to 30%, 42%, and 55% respectively. The situation in 
2014/15 was similar to that in 2009/10 for women from professional class backgrounds, 
but teenage childbearing has fallen among those from less advantaged backgrounds. 
This suggests that the decline in teenage childbearing observed in national statistics 
(ONS, 2016a) is being driven by declines in childbearing among the less advantaged. 
 
Marriage has become an increasing irrelevant social marker for the transition to 
adulthood in the UK as for many other developed countries (Arnett, 2001) because 
fewer people are marrying, and if they do so, they marry at later ages. The average age 
at first marriage in England rose by five years between 1991 and 2013, from 28 to 33 
years for men and from 26 to 31 years for women (ONS, 2016b). The average age at 
marriage is now higher than the average age at entry into motherhood. Increasingly 
parenthood takes place before marriage. To some extent cohabitation has replaced 
marriage as the setting for entry into parenthood, but there continue to be a significant 
  
 
27 
minority of young women who make the transition to motherhood before having 
experienced any co-residential partnership (Berrington, 2014).  
 
Thus the sequencing of entry into marriage, cohabitation and parenthood as 
markers of transition to adulthood has become increasingly diverse. These trends are 
reflected in Figure 5 where in 1991 the vast majority of mothers in their late twenties 
were married, with only a very small proportion living as cohabiting mothers. By 
2009/10 only a small minority of mothers in their early twenties are currently married, 
the majority are living as lone mothers, with the rest living with a cohabiting partner. 
Among mothers in their late twenties there has also been a move away from marriage, 
although it is more common than at younger ages. Nevertheless, roughly equal 
proportions of mothers in their late twenties in the UK are either married, cohabiting or 
living as a lone mother.  
 
There are significant socio-economic differentials in the likelihood that young 
adults experience family dissolution during their transition to adulthood. Lone 
motherhood was already reasonably common in 1991, particularly among women from 
poorer socio-economic backgrounds. By 2009/10 the proportion of mothers living as a 
lone parent had increased significantly among all classes, but the increase is much 
larger for women from routine class backgrounds.  
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a) 20-24 
 
b) 25-29 
Figure 5: Percentage of UK-born1 women aged a) 20-24 and b) 25-29 who are mothers, by current family 
type, according to parental class, UK, 1991, 2009/10  & 2014/15 
Sources: 1991 from wave 1 of BHPS, 2009/10 from wave 1 of UKHLS, 2014/15 from Labour Force 
Surveys. 1refers to individuals who were either born in UK, or who arrived aged under 15.  
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These very different partnership contexts within which women (and men) are bearing 
and rearing children have important implications for their transitions to adulthood. The 
household income of young lone parents tends to be much lower than couple family 
households. Additionally, the low value of benefit received and the complex mix of 
sources of welfare benefit mean that it is often difficult for lone parents to achieve 
financial security (Millar and Ridge, 2009) and hence to achieve economic 
independence from their parents. At the same time, low income non-resident parents 
(the majority of whom are fathers) fare rather badly in terms of their access to social 
housing and means-tested child allowances since they are not classified as having 
dependants. Stone and colleagues (2014) demonstrate that upon partnership dissolution, 
young fathers are far more likely to return to their parental home, than are young lone 
mothers, which the authors attribute to UK welfare policies which prioritise access to 
social housing and additional social assistance e.g. in housing benefit and child tax 
credits for those classified as having dependants living with them. 
 
 The number of young lone parents is much higher in the UK than it is in many 
other European countries (Chzhen and Bradshaw, 2012). Thus gender differences in 
transitions to adulthood resulting from differential responsibilities for child-rearing will 
be larger in the UK than elsewhere. These gender differences and their intersection with 
labour market activity, social assistance, and housing provision have not been 
sufficiently explored in the literature and demand further research. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper had two objectives, firstly to consider whether UK youth social policy has 
become more familialized in recent decades, and secondly to provide new empirical 
evidence as to whether the achievement of social markers of adulthood is being 
postponed to later ages and how this change might differ by parental class. 
 
We argue that increasing restrictions in access to welfare benefits for the 
youngest age groups, and rises in the age at which young people are entitled to the 
‘adult rate’ of some benefits reflect a policy emphasis on encouraging young people to 
be supported by their family of origin to later ages. These policy changes coincided 
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with increases in the economic need and dependency of UK young adults as a result of 
structural and institutional changes to the educational sector, the youth labour market 
and housing market. As a result of the coming together of these forces, the transition to 
adulthood in the UK has become extended, less linear and riskier.   
 
In this paper we have documented significant delays in the attainment of adult 
social roles among all social groups. For some transitions, e.g. entry into motherhood 
socio-economic differences in timing were historically very large (Jones, 2002), but 
have reduced in the most recent period due to the declines in teenage childbearing 
among women from disadvantaged backgrounds. However, although the relative 
differences have reduced, the increase in the alternative partnership settings within 
which childbearing occurs (i.e., cohabitation, lone motherhood) still leaves young 
mothers from socially disadvantaged background in a potentially vulnerable position.  
On the other hand, for transitions to independence from the parental home the class 
differences are more complex. Among young adults in their twenties, the likelihood of 
living in the parental home has increased most for more advantaged young adults. 
Berrington and Stone (2014) argue that living with parents for young people aged in 
their early to mid-twenties has become normative among middle class families whose 
children often return home at the end of full time education. However, by the time 
young people reach their early thirties only a minority remain living with their parents. 
We might assume therefore that this behaviour is considered non-normative. Young 
adults, particularly men from routine and manual class backgrounds are over-
represented in this group.  Furthermore, the proportion of young men from routine and 
manual backgrounds living with their parents in their early thirties has increased since 
the economic downturn and now stands at about one fifth, double the proportion of men 
from professional backgrounds. More research on the implications of extended co-
residence for disadvantaged young people and their parents is required. 
 
The life course perspective highlights how transitions within different life 
domains (work, housing, family) are inter-connected and financial security underlies 
success in transitions to adulthood in other domains. In the absence of reliable data on 
young adults’ income, including financial transfers from other family members, we 
used a proxy measure of economic precarity. We argued that young adults no longer in 
full time education, who are unemployed or economically inactive, or are employed in 
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a routine or manual job represent those on low, and insecure, incomes. Our findings 
highlighted the way in which educational qualifications, particularly having a degree, 
mediate the relationship between parental class and young adults’ own occupational 
class. Non graduates were seen to be over three times more likely to be in a precarious 
economic position than graduates. Furthermore, within our two educational groups, 
who did and did not have a degree, there remains a class gradient in the likelihood of 
being in a precarious position. Even among graduate men, those from routine and 
manual class backgrounds were almost twice as likely to be in a precarious position 
(15%) as compared those from professional class backgrounds (8%). 
 
Furthermore, the lack of training and career progression associated with many 
routine and manual occupations may mean that the current cohorts of young adults will 
find it difficult to make some successful transitions to adulthood. Previous academic 
research highlighted the scarring effect of unemployment in young adulthood on wages 
in later life (Gregg and Tominey, 2005). New research is required to quantify the effect 
of under-employment and low waged work on successful transitions through young 
adulthood and into mid-life.    
 
The extension of the young adult phase of the life course has taken place over a 
number of decades, and is not just a response associated with the economic shocks of 
the 2008 recession. Nevertheless, problems relating to low pay and housing 
unaffordability since 2008 have accelerated for example the trend for increased co-
residence between young adults and their parents.  The ability to make successful 
transitions out of the parental home depends increasingly on parents’ ability and 
willingness to provide financial support. Additionally, the rapidly rising costs of higher 
education, including those associated with the introduction of, and increased cost of 
tuition fees, mean that young people are increasingly entering the labour and housing 
markets with significant levels of debt. In this situation, the role of parents and other 
family members in cushioning new social risks becomes even more important. This 
burden is difficult to bear for the poor, but is increasingly also for the so-called 
‘squeezed middle’, especially the ‘sandwich generation’ of adults with both younger 
and older dependants (Grundy and Henretta, 2006). Much of the recent policy making 
in the UK appears to have been made without consideration as to the ability and 
willingness of parents to support their adult children.  There are large socio-economic 
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inequalities in the amount of financial and practical support that richer parents can 
provide their children to support their transition to adulthood (Albertini and Radl, 
2012). Joseph and Rowlingson (2015) found in their qualitative interviews that parents 
want to support their children so that they can become independent, get married and 
established in a vocation. Their interviewees noted the apparent paradox in the fact that 
they were supporting their adult children financially so that they become financially 
independent. Parents are therefore facing a longer period of financial support for their 
children and thus inequalities in resources within the parental generation are transmitted 
to the next generation via their ability to support their offspring’s transition to 
adulthood.  
 
The structural constraints facing low income adults in their transitions to 
adulthood as discussed by Bynner (2005) and MacDonald and colleagues (2005) 
remain and arguably have increased. Evidence presented in this paper suggests that 
differences in transitions to adulthood according to social background are likely to 
widen further in the future. This emphasis on the role of class background in structuring 
trajectories to adulthood can be contrasted with the more optimistic view of why 
transitions to adulthood are being postponed as put forward by Arnett (2004), where 
more weight is given to young people’s desire to explore new life experiences, for 
example taking ‘gap years’, exploring different jobs and relationships, before settling 
down. The reality of young people’s lives encompasses both perspectives, depending 
upon personal circumstance which can change rapidly over the young adult phase. 
Young adults are not all the same and future research should, where data are available, 
further examine how class, gender and ethnicity intersect with transitions to adulthood.  
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